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Abstract. This paper describes the VeriFast prototype program verifi-
cation tool, which implements a separation-logic-based approach for the
specification and verification of safety properties of pointer-manipula-
ting imperative programs. The approach’s distinctive feature is that it
combines very good and predictable verification performance with pow-
erful proofs written conveniently as part of the program. We describe the
tool’s support for the C language.
The paper introduces the tool’s various features by means of a running
example of a linked list implementation. A detailed formalization of the
core of the approach and a soundness proof are available on the website.
1 Introduction
VeriFast is a research prototype program verification tool for verification of safety
properties of C and Java programs, based on separation logic.
The safety properties to be verified are specified as annotations in the source
code, in the form of function preconditions and postconditions expressed as sep-
aration logic assertions. To enable rich specifications, the user may include ad-
ditional annotations that define inductive datatypes, primitive recursive pure
functions over these datatypes, and abstract predicates (i.e. named, parame-
terized assertions). Abstract predicates may be recursive. A restricted form of
existential quantification is supported in assertions in the form of pattern match-
ing.
Verification is based on forward symbolic execution, where memory is repre-
sented as a separate conjunction of points-to assertions and abstract predicate
assertions, and data values are represented as first-order logic terms with a set
of constraints. Abstract predicates must be folded and unfolded explicitly us-
ing ghost statements. Rewritings of the abstract state that require induction,
or derivations of facts over data values that require induction, can be done by
defining lemma functions, which are like ordinary C functions except that it is
checked that they terminate. Specifically, when a lemma function performs a
recursive call, either the recursive call must apply to a strict subset of memory,
or one of its parameters must be an inductive value whose size decreases at each
recursive call.
Assertions over data values are delegated to an SMT solver, formulated as
queries against an axiomatization of the inductive datatypes and recursive pure
? Bart Jacobs is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO)
functions. Importantly, no exhaustiveness axioms are included in this axiomati-
zation; this prevents the SMT solver from performing case analysis on inductive
values. Combined with a measure to prevent infinite reductions due to self-feeding
recursions, this ensures termination of the SMT solver.
A prototype implementation, a formalization and soundness proof, a tuto-
rial text, and a large number of example annotated programs are available at
http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/˜bartj/verifast/. The implementation includes an IDE
that enables the user to step through a failed execution trace, inspecting the
symbolic state at each step.
2 Walkthrough
We introduce the approach through an example annotated C program that im-
plements a linked list ADT. Successive figures show successive fragments of the
example program.
2.1 Symbolic execution and predicates
VeriFast performs symbolic execution. The symbolic state consists of three parts:
the symbolic heap, the symbolic store, and the path condition. The symbolic
heap is a bag of chunks. A chunk consists of a predicate name and an argument
list. Chunk arguments are terms of first-order logic. The predicate name may
be the predicate corresponding to a struct field, in which case we call the chunk
a points-to chunk. A points-to chunk has two arguments: a term denoting the
address of the struct, and a term denoting the field value. The predicate name
may also refer to a user-defined predicate.
The symbolic store maps local variable names to terms that denote the vari-
able’s current value. The path condition is a set of formulae of first-order logic.
These constrain the interpretation of the logical symbols used in the terms in
the symbolic store and the symbolic heap.
In the implementation, the terms are SMT solver terms, and the path con-
dition corresponds to the state of the SMT solver. The verifier pushes formulae
into the SMT solver during symbolic execution, and pops them when a branch
of symbolic execution is finished and the next branch is started.
Notice that this means that the SMT solver does not come into contact
with the heap. The heap is dealt with syntactically within the verifier itself.
This avoids the quantified formulae required by verification condition generation-
based approaches to describe heap effects.
Figure 1 shows function createNode. It uses an abstract predicate [16] to hide
the internal layout of a node. The close ghost statement removes the points-to
chunks for the individual fields of n from the symbolic heap, and adds a node
abstract predicate chunk, as expected by the postcondition. The asterisk denotes
separating conjunction: P ∗ Q holds if the heap can be split into two separate
parts such that P holds for one part and Q for the other. As we will see, oper-
ationally, in our tool the asterisk means sequential composition of consumption
struct node { struct node ∗next ; int value; };
predicate node(struct node ∗n, struct node ∗next , int value) =
n→next 7→ next ∗ n→value 7→ value ∗malloc block node(n);
struct node ∗create node(struct node ∗next , int value)
requires emp; ensures node(result ,next , value);
{
struct node ∗n := malloc(sizeof(struct node));
n→next := next ; n→value := value;
close node(n,next , value); return n;
}
Fig. 1. Example demonstrating abstract predicates and ghost statements (Note: an-
notations are shown on a gray background. Also, for readability, we typeset some
operators differently from the implementation.)
or production of assertions. That is, consuming P ∗Q means first consuming P
and then Q; producing P ∗Q means first producing P and then Q.
When symbolically executing function create node, the successive symbolic
states are as follows:
// h = ∅, s = {next 7→ next, value 7→ value}, Σ = ∅
struct node ∗n := malloc(sizeof(struct node));
// h = {node next(n, value0),node value(n, value1),malloc block node(n)},
// s = {n 7→ n,next 7→ next, value 7→ value}, Σ = {n 6= 0}
n→next := next ; n→value := value;
// h = {node next(n, next),node value(n, value),malloc block node(n)},
// s = {n 7→ n,next 7→ next, value 7→ value}, Σ = {n 6= 0}
close node(n,next , value);
// h = {node(n, next, value)}
// s = {n 7→ n,next 7→ next, value 7→ value}, Σ = {n 6= 0}
Italic names denote program variables; sans serif names denote logical symbols.
At the start of symbolic execution, fresh symbols are generated for the function
arguments. In the example, fresh symbols are also generated by the malloc call to
denote malloc’s return value and the initial values of the newly allocated fields.
Figure 2 shows a way to denote a piece of memory containing a set of con-
secutive nodes. Specifically, abstract predicate lseg(n1 ,n2 , v) represents a set of
consecutive nodes where the first node is at n1 and the last node’s next pointer
points to n2 , and the nodes store the list of integers v. As a special case, if n1
equals n2 , the predicate denotes the empty piece of memory.
During symbolic execution of a function, assertions are produced and con-
sumed. Producing a points-to assertion or an abstract predicate assertion means
adding the corresponding chunk to the symbolic heap, and consuming it means
inductive list = nil | cons(int, list);
predicate lseg(struct node ∗n1 , struct node ∗n2 , list v) =
n1 = n2 ? v = nil : node(n1 , ?n, ?h) ∗ lseg(n,n2 , ?t) ∗ v = cons(h, t);
Fig. 2. Example demonstrating inductive datatype definitions, recursive abstract pred-
icates, conditional assertions, and pattern matching
removing a matching chunk from the symbolic heap. If no matching chunk is
present in the symbolic heap, an error is reported. If the assertion being con-
sumed contains patterns, the matching process binds the pattern variables; their
scope includes the rest of the assertion, or if the pattern occurs in a function
body or precondition, its scope includes the rest of the function. Producing a
pure assertion (i.e., a boolean expression), means adding it to the path condition,
and consuming it means asking the SMT solver to check that it follows from the
current path condition. Producing or consuming a separate conjunction means
first producing, resp. consuming the first operand, and then producing, resp.
consuming the second operand. Producing or consuming emp does nothing. If
during execution of a function, a conditional construct is encountered, then the
remainder of the execution is performed once for each branch of the construct,
after adding the corresponding constraint to the path condition. The conditional
constructs include the if and switch statements, the if-then-else assertions, and
the switch assertions.
Execution of a function starts with an empty symbolic heap and an empty
path condition. Then, the precondition is produced. Then, each statement is ex-
ecuted. And finally, the postcondition is consumed. If subsequently, any chunks
are left in the symbolic heap, this is considered a potential memory leak and an
error is reported. Execution of a function call statement proceeds by first con-
suming the call’s precondition and then producing its postcondition. Execution
of an open ghost statement proceeds by first consuming the abstract predicate
assertion and then producing its body. Execution of a close ghost statement
proceeds by first consuming the predicate’s body and then adding the abstract
predicate chunk. Patterns may be used as abstract predicate arguments in an
open statement, but in the current implementation they cannot be used as ar-
guments in a close statement.
Figure 3 shows the first part of the client-visible interface of the linked list
ADT. The implementation keeps a sentinel node at the end of the list, and it
keeps a pointer to the first node and to this sentinel node. The dummy patterns
( ) in the definition of the llist predicate indicate that the next and value fields
of the sentinel node are insignificant.
struct llist { struct node ∗first ; struct node ∗last ; };
predicate llist(struct llist ∗l, list v) =
l→first 7→ ?fn ∗ l→last 7→ ?ln ∗ lseg(fn, ln, v) ∗ node(ln, , ) ∗malloc block llist(l);
struct llist ∗create llist()
requires emp;
ensures llist(result ,nil);
{
struct llist ∗l := malloc(sizeof(struct llist));
struct node ∗n := create node(0, 0); l→first := n; l→last := n;
close lseg(n, n,nil); close llist(l,nil);
return l;
}
Fig. 3. Example demonstrating dummy patterns
lemma void distinct nodes(struct node ∗n1 , struct node ∗n2 )
requires node(n1 , ?n1n, ?n1v) ∗ node(n2 , ?n2n, ?n2v);
ensures node(n1 ,n1n,n1v) ∗ node(n2 ,n2n,n2v) ∗ n1 6= n2;
{
open node(n1 , , ); open node(n2 , , );
close node(n1 ,n1n,n1v); close node(n2 ,n2n,n2v);
}
Fig. 4. Example demonstrating lemma functions, distinctness constraint production
and patterns in open statements
2.2 Lemma functions
Figure 4 shows a lemma function, which is like a C function except that it is
declared in an annotation and the verifier checks that it terminates and that it
has no effect on memory (i.e. it does not allocate, free, or write to memory).
The only effect of calling a lemma function is that it rewrites the symbolic heap
into a semantically equivalent but syntactically different one, and/or that it adds
constraints to the path condition.
In this example, there is no net change to the symbolic heap; all the lemma
function does is add a constraint. Specifically, given two nodes for which there
are separate abstract predicate chunks in the symbolic heap, the lemma produces
a constraint that says that the nodes are distinct.
Such distinctness constraints are not produced automatically by the verifier
for abstract predicate chunks, since the fact that two abstract predicate chunks
referring to the same abstract predicate appear in memory does not imply any-
thing about distinctness of the arguments. However, the verifier produces them
for points-to chunks. Specifically, when producing a points-to assertion t→f 7→ v,
then for any existing points-to chunk t′→f 7→ v′ in the symbolic heap, a con-
straint t 6= t′ is added automatically. In the example, this occurs during execution
of the second open statement.
fixpoint list add(list v, int x) {
switch (v) {
case nil : return cons(x,nil);
case cons(h, t) :
return cons(h, add(t, x));
}
}
lemma add lemma(struct node ∗n1 ,
struct node ∗n2 , struct node ∗n3 )
requires lseg(n1 ,n2 , ?v)
∗ node(n2 ,n3 , ?x) ∗ node(n3 , , );
ensures lseg(n1 ,n3 , add(v, x))
∗ node(n3 , , );
{
distinct nodes(n2 ,n3 );
open lseg(n1 , , );
if (n1 = n2 ) {
close lseg(n3 ,n3 ,nil);
} else {
distinct nodes(n1 ,n3 );
open node(n1 , ?n1n, ?n1v);
add lemma(n1n,n2 ,n3 );
close node(n1 ,n1n,n1v);
}
close lseg(n1 ,n3 , add(v, x));
}
void add(struct llist ∗l, int x)
requires llist(l, ?v);
ensures llist(l, add(v, x));
{
open llist(l, v);
struct node ∗n := create node(0, 0);
struct node ∗nl := l→last ;
open node(nl , , );
nl→next := n;
nl→value := x;
close node(nl , n, x);
l→last := n;
struct node ∗nf := l→first ;
add lemma(nf ,nl ,n);
close llist(l, add(v, x));
}
Fig. 5. Example demonstrating fixpoint functions and recursive lemma functions
Figure 5 shows the second client-visible list ADT function, function add . It
adds a value to the end of the list. Its contract describes its effect on the ADT’s
abstract value using the fixpoint function add . (Note that fixpoint function names
and non-fixpoint (i.e., regular or lemma) function names are in separate names-
paces; the former may occur only in expressions in annotations, whereas the
latter may occur only in call statements.)
A fixpoint function is not allowed to read or modify memory. Its body must
be a switch statement over one of the function’s parameters. We call this param-
eter the function’s inductive parameter. The body of each clause of the switch
statement must be a return statement. A fixpoint function may call other fix-
point functions, but not regular functions or lemma functions. Furthermore, to
ensure termination, any call must either be a call of a fixpoint function declared
earlier in the program, or it must be a direct recursive call where the argument
for the inductive parameter is a variable bound by the switch statement.
Regular function add creates a new node to serve as the new sentinel node,
then updates the old sentinel node’s fields, and finally calls the lemma func-
tion add lemma to merge the old sentinel node into the lseg abstract predicate
chunk. The lemma function does so using recursion. Lemma functions may per-
form recursive calls, but only direct recursive calls, and termination is ensured
by checking that at each recursive call either the size of the piece of memory
that the function operates on decreases (specifically, after consuming the pre-
condition there must be a points-to chunk left in the symbolic heap), or, similar
to a fixpoint function, the function’s body is a switch statement over one of its
parameters, and the argument for the inductive parameter in the recursive call
is bound by this switch statement. Note that a recursive lemma constitutes an
inductive proof of the fact that the precondition implies the postcondition.
int removeFirst(struct llist ∗l)
requires llist(l, ?v) ∗ v 6= nil ; ensures llist(l, ?t) ∗ v = cons(result , t);
{
open llist(l, v);
struct node ∗nf := l→first ; open lseg(nf , ?nl , v); open node(nf , , );
struct node ∗nfn := nf→next ; int nfv := nf→value; free(nf ); l→first := nfn;
open lseg(nfn,nl , ?t); close lseg(nfn,nl , t); close llist(l, t);
return nfv ;
}
Fig. 6. Example demonstrating execution splits due to conditional constructs in the
bodies of predicates being opened
2.3 Case splits
Figure 6 shows a function that removes the first element from a list. It requires
that the list is non-empty. When the lseg starting at nf is opened, an execu-
tion split occurs because the body of this predicate is an if-then-else assertion.
The verifier notices immediately that the then branch is infeasible and does not
continue execution on this branch.
Notice also that the first node is freed. A statement free(p); looks for a
chunk of the form malloc block T (p), and then for points-to chunks of the form
p→f 7→ v, for each field f of T , and it removes all of these chunks.
void dispose(struct llist ∗l)
requires llist(l, );
ensures emp;
{
open llist(l, );
struct node ∗n := l→first ;
struct node ∗nl := l→last ;
while (n 6= nl)
invariant lseg(n,nl , );
{
open lseg(n,nl , );
open node(n, , );
struct node ∗next := n→next ;
free(n);
n := next ;
}
open lseg(n, n, );
open node(l, , );
free(nl);
free(l);
}
Fig. 7. Example demonstrating loops
void main()
requires emp;
ensures emp;
{
struct llist ∗l := create llist();
add(l, 10);
add(l, 20);
add(l, 30);
add(l, 40);
int x0 := removeFirst(l);
assert(x0 = 10);
int x1 := removeFirst(l);
assert(x1 = 20);
dispose(l);
}
Fig. 8. Example client program for the
list ADT
2.4 Loops
Figure 7 shows function dispose, which takes a list of arbitrary length. It first
frees all proper nodes, then it removes the remaining empty lseg assertion, then
it frees the sentinel node, and finally it frees the struct llist object itself. A loop
invariant must be provided for each loop. Execution of a loop proceeds by first
consuming the loop invariant, assigning fresh symbols to the locals modified by
the loop body, and producing the loop invariant again. Then execution proceeds
along two branches: in one branch, the loop condition is produced, then the
loop body is executed, and finally the loop invariant is consumed. If any chunks
remain, this is considered a leak error. In the other branch, first the negation
of the loop condition is produced, and then execution proceeds after the loop
statement.
Figure 8 wraps up the example by showing an example client program for
the list ADT. This program verifies; it follows that all assert statements succeed
and no memory is leaked.
Notice that the SMT solver successfully evaluates the add fixpoint function
applications.
3 Performance
The time complexity of verification is unbounded in theory. Specifically, since
recursive pure functions of arbitrary time complexity may be defined, there is
no bound on the time complexity of SMT queries. Furthermore, the approach,
as currently implemented, does not perform joining of symbolic execution paths
after conditional constructs; therefore, the number of symbolic execution steps
is exponential in the number of such constructs. However, since no significant
search is performed implicitly by the verifier or the SMT solver, performance is
very good in practice.
The table below shows indicative verification times for a few example pro-
grams.
program total # lines # annotation lines time taken (seconds)
chat server 242 114 0.08
linked list and iterator 332 194 0.09
composite 345 263 0.09
JavaCard applet 340 95 0.51
GameServer 383 148 0.23
4 Related work
Reynolds [17] introduced separation logic. Smallfoot [3] is a tool that performs
symbolic execution using separation logic. This technique has been extended for
greater automation [19], for termination proofs [4, 6], for fine-grained concur-
rency [5], for lock-based concurreny [11], and for Java [8, 12]. Unlike VeriFast,
all of these tools attempt to infer loop invariants automatically.
Alternative specification and verification approaches, based on generation of
verification conditions instead of symbolic execution, include VCC [7], Caduceus
[9], ESC-Java [10], KeY [2], Jahob [20], regional logic [1], and approaches based
on dynamic frames [13] including VeriCool [18], Dafny [14], and Chalice [15].
5 Conclusion
We presented an approach for specification and verification of imperative pro-
grams, that combines very good and predictable verification performance with
powerful proofs written conveniently as part of the program. We are currently
working to increase the degree of automation while preserving these strengths.
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